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CRIMINAL

LAW-RESENTENCING-CREDIT

NOT

ALLOWED

FOR

TIME SERVED UNDER VOID CONVICTION*-If a criminal defendant
imprisoned pursuant to an invalid sentence is subsequently resentenced on the same charge, the courts usually permit the time served
under the invalid sentence to be deducted from the legal sentence imposed.' However, most courts do not grant credit for time served
under a void conviction when the defendant is reconvicted and resentenced on the original charge. 2 A few states have statutory provisions requiring the allowance of credit regardless of whether the
time was served pursuant to an invalid sentence or a void conviction.' The rationale of courts making the distinction between an
invalid sentence and a void conviction is that an invalid sentence is
merely a product of judicial error and can be easily corrected, 4 while
a void conviction is considered a nullity in law and of no legal effect. 5
This common interpretation of the effect of a void conviction arose
from the common law rule that a defendant who had once served
any portion of this sentence could not be retried on the same charge.'
The courts overcame the defense of double jeopardy as a bar to a
second trial by declaring the original conviction void and of no legal
consequence. 7 Should New Mexico continue its untenable adherence
to the majority rule, which makes specious distinctions between void
convictions and invalid sentences, to deprive the defendant of credit
for time already served in prison?
The case of Morgan v. Cox' was a habeas corpus proceeding
wherein Morgan petitioned the supreme court to compel the warden
of the state penitentiary to credit time served under a void conviction
to the sentence imposed when he was reconvicted on the identical
0 Morgan v.

Cox, 406 P.2d 347 (N.M. 1965).
1. 5 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure § 2216, at 433 (12th ed. 1957).
2. Id. at 432. But see, Short v. United States, 344 F.2d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (defendant's new sentence could not he such that his total time served in prison might exceed
the statutory maximum for that offense) ; Vellucci v. Cochran, 138 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1962)
(credit awarded as a matter of course) ; Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 187 Va. 250, 46 S.E.2d
406 (1948) (defendant to receive proper credit for sixteen years in prison, after conviction declared void).
3. E.g., Cal. Pen. Code § 2900.1; N.Y. Pen. Law § 2193 (4) ; Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 9.95.063 (1961).
4. E.g., Lewis v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 445, 108 N.E.2d 922, 35 A.L.R.2d 1277
(1952).
5. 5 Wharton, op. cit. supra note 1, at 433, and cases cited therein.
6. For a concise discussion of the origin and development of the void conviction
doctrine, see Whalen, Resentence Without Credit For Time Served: Unequal Protection
Of The Laws, 35 Minn. L. Rev. 239, 240 (1951).
7. Id. at 242-43.
8. 406 P.2d 347 (N.M. 1965).
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charge. The background of Morgan was that the petitioner had
pleaded guilty to four felony counts and had been sentenced on
February 11, 1963, to a term of one-to-three years on the first two
counts and a term of one-to-ten years on the second two counts. All
but three years on the second two counts were suspended, and all
sentences were to run concurrently. After serving seventeen months
in the state penitentiary, Morgan's conviction was declared void
because he had been denied the benefit of counsel at trial.' Upon
remand to the trial court, the petitioner pleaded guilty to the first
count of the original information,"0 and was sentenced to a term of
one-to-three years in the penitentiary. The trial court suspended this
sentence "during good behavior." Subsequently, the suspended sentence was revoked, and Morgan was returned to prison. On Morgan's petition for credit for time served pursuant to the void conviction the New Mexico Supreme Court, held, Quashed," stating
that credit would not be allowed where the original proceeding was
void. 2
Nine months prior to Morgan, the New Mexico Supreme Court
decided Sneed v. Cox.'8 In Sneed, the court permitted the petitioner
to receive credit for time served under an invalid sentence after he
was legally resentenced on the same charge. In deciding Sneed, the
court relied upon its statement in State v. Garcia:'"
'There exists in every court, however, an inherent power to see that a
man's fundamental rights are protected in every case. . . . [T]his
court has the power in its discretion, to relieve him and to see that
injustice is not done."15

Significantly, the supreme court in Sneed was concerned that unless
credit were allowed, the petitioner would remain in prison for
eighteen months after the date of release fixed by the invalid sen9. Morgan v. Cox, No. 35180, 1st Dist., Santa Fe County, N.M., July 17, 1964.
10. There is no record of the disposition of the remaining three counts to which
petitioner had originally pleaded guilty on February 11, 1963.
11. 406 P.2d at 348.
12. Ibid.
The supreme court observed that because the petitioner had not had the benefit
of counsel at his original trial, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner.
Thus, the original conviction and sentence were void. 406 P.2d at 347, 348.
13. 74 N.M. 659, 397 P.2d 308 (1964).
14. 19 N.M. 414, 143 Pac. 1012 (1914).
15. 74 N.M. at 663, 397 P.2d at 310. (Emphasis added.)
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tence.1 8 The court said: "That ' such
a result is inherently unfair and
17
unjust is not subject to dispute.
In Morgan, however, the court did not concern itself with the
"unjust result." The court felt secure in adopting the general rule
and chose not to discuss the archaic legal reasoning that compelled it
to ignore the period of time served under the petitioner's void conviction. This acceptance of the majority rule by the New Mexico
Supreme Court implies an acceptance of the reasoning supporting
this rule: a void conviction restores the state and the defendant to
the same position they enjoyed prior to the arraignment of the
real period in the defendant's life is merely
defendant.'8 Thus, a very
9
a fiction to the court.'
The practice of not giving effect to action taken pursuant to a
void judgment is peculiar to the criminal courts. In a civil case the
court attempts to place the parties in the position they enjoyed prior
to the void judgment, and in so doing the court takes into consideration any action taken pursuant to the void judgment. 20 It follows
that one who has paid moneys to satisfy a civil judgment would be
entitled to recover the sum if the judgment is subsequently declared
void because it is without legal effect.
It would seem that the position of the criminal defendant who has
served time pursuant to a void conviction, is analogous to that of
the civil litigant who has made payment in satisfaction of a void
judgment. If the courts can compel the return of moneys paid in
satisfaction of a void civil judgment they certainly should grant
credit to the criminal defendant who has "paid" with time in prison
to satisfy a void conviction. In criminal law the void proceeding
should be viewed as it is in civil law wherein only the judgment itself
16. The maximum terms of the valid and the invalid sentences in Sneed were
identical. The minimum term of the invalid sentence was in conflict with the applicable
statute. Sneed v. Cox, 74 N.M. 659, 397 P.2d 308 (1964).
17. Id. at 663, 397 P.2d at 310.
18. The New Mexico Supreme Court in Morgan cited with approval Ex parte
Wilkerson, 76 Okla. Crim. 204, 135 P.2d 507 (1943), which stated this reasoning.
19. A similar result has not escaped comment in the federal courts:
'The Government's brief suggests . . . that because the first sentence was
void appellant has served no sentence but has merely spent time in the penitentiary; that since he should not have been imprisoned as he was, he was not
imprisoned at all. . . . [I]t might be suggested that he is liable in quasicontract for the value of his board and lodging, and criminally liable for obtaining them by false pretenses. We cannot take this optimistic view.'
Short v. United States, 344 F.2d 550, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1965), quoting King v. United
States, 98 F.2d 291, 293-94 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
20. E.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Title to property does not pass by
sale under an execution issued upon a void judgment.

JANUARY, 1966"]

COMMENTS

is without legal effect, thus permitting the courts to retry the criminal
defendant without placing him in double jeopardy.
The inequity of the New Mexico Supreme Court's application of
the void conviction doctrine is aptly revealed by comparing Sneed
and Morgan. In both cases the petitioner was resentenced for his
original crime as a result of circumstances beyond his control. Sneed's
only request was that he be sentenced in accordance with the applicable statute, whereas Morgan sought his constitutional right to a
fair trial. Yet Sneed alone received credit for time in prison because
he was the fortuitous recipient of an invalid sentence rather than
a "victim" of a void conviction. Although Morgan was a victim
without fault, he may now serve up to fifty-four months for a crime
for which he was twice sentenced to a maximum term of three
years. 2 There cannot be any doubt that this consequence of Mor' 22
gan's effort to obtain a fair trial is "inherently unfair and unjust.
More important, however, are the far-reaching effects of cases
like Morgan. Encouraged by the recent United States Supreme
Court decisions affirming the constitutional rights of criminal defendants to a fair trial,23 many convicted felons are contesting their
convictions in New Mexico.2 4 To these prisoners the lesson of Morgan is clear. If a prisoner obtains a reversal of his first conviction
because he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial, he will
probably be retried on the same charge. 25 If, upon retrial, the defendant is reconvicted, he can only look forward to a "new" sentence with little hope that the court will give him credit for the time
he has already served.2 6 Faced with the prospect of having to wager
21. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
22. Sneed v. Cox, 74 N.M. 659, 663, 397 P.2d 308, 310 (1964).
23. The landmark decision is, of course, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(right to counsel at trial). See also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (right to
counsel at pre-arraignment interrogation) ; Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)
(declaring unconstitutional the procedure of jury determination of voluntariness of
confessions) ; Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (right to counsel during
post-arraignment interrogation).
24. Interview With Mr. Gary 0. O'Dowd, Assistant Attorney General of New
Mexico, Nov. 22, 1965. In the ten month period of January 1, 1965, to October 31, 1965,
452 writs of habeas corpus were heard by New Mexico courts. On October 31, 1965,
151 writs of habeas corpus were pending in New Mexico. During the entire year of
1964, 329 habeas corpus cases were disposed of by New Mexico courts.
25. It is suggested that in a few cases the evidence required for reconviction will be
stale or non-existent and the petitioner will be released because the charges will be
dropped.
26. In New Mexico the fact that the petitioner has served time prior to application
for writ of habeas corpus is a proper matter to urge in mitigation when he is resentenced. Jordon v. Swope, 36 N.M. 84, 8 P.2d 788 (1932). Apparently the trial court in
Morgan considered the fact of prior imprisonment when it suspended his second sen-
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time served against the possibility of being found innocent upon
retrial, it is submitted that few "felons" will seek the remedy afforded them by Gideon v. Wainwright,21 and subsequent related
Supreme Court decisions.2 s
These defendants, denied their constitutional right to a fair trial,
may properly seek their release from confinement by writ of habeas
corpus. 29 The writ of habeas corpus is given explicit recognition in
the federal constitution,8" and in the New Mexico constitution."1 In
the recent case of Fay v. Noia,82 the United States Supreme Court
reviewed at length the historical development of the writ of habeas
corpus and said:
We do well to bear in mind the extraordinary prestige of the Great
Writ . . . in Anglo-American jurisprudence: 'the most celebrated
writ in the English law.' . . . It is 'a writ antecedent to statute.' ....
[The writ of habeas corpus] was early confirmed by Chief Justice
John Marshall to be a 'great constitutional privilege.' . . . Only
two Terms ago this Court had occasion to reaffirm the high place of
the writ in our jurisprudence: 'We repeat what has been so truly
said of the federal writ: "there is no higher duty than to maintain
it unimpaired" . . . and unsuspended . . .3
The effect of the void conviction doctrine, however, is to discourage
the use of the writ of habeas corpus. By threatening a prison inmate
with the possibility of a second sentence being imposed without
credit for time already served the state deters him for resorting to
the writ of habeas corpus, his only available remedy to redress a
deprivation of his constitutional rights. It is submitted, therefore,
that enforcement of the void conviction doctrine is unconstitutional
because it discourages and thereby "impairs" utilization of the writ
of habeas corpus.
This constitutional argument has never been discussed by a court.
However, the United States Supreme Court has acted in other areas
of the law to declare unconstitutional a procedure that infringed
tence. However, the courts are not bound to give credit and there is no guarantee that
prior imprisonment will be given due consideration in each case.
27. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
28. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368
(1964) ; Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
29. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
30. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9(2).
31. N.M. Const. art. 2, § 7.
32. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
33. Id. at 399-400.
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upon the enjoyment of a "great constitutional privilege." In Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 4 the Supreme Court was required to determine the constitutionality of a federal statute that denied members
of a political organization the right to apply for or to use a passport. In support of its holding that the statute was unconstitutional
because it infringed upon the fundamental right of freedom of
travel, the court quoted from its language in Shelton v. Tucker :a
'[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved.'36
The stated purpose of the void conviction doctrine is to avoid the
bar of double jeopardy so that the defendant may be retried. But
the doctrine is so broadly applied that not only is the conviction void
but the time served pursuant to the void conviction is lost. This
broad application of the void conviction doctrine "stifles fundamental personal liberties" because it discourages a prison inmate from
utilizing the writ of habeas corpus to secure his constitutional rights.
The purpose of the void conviction doctrine could be narrowly
achieved by a determination that only the void conviction itself was
without legal effect. If credit were given for time served under the
void conviction, prison inmates would not fear the consequences of
seeking review of their convictions by the writ of habeas corpus"a great constitutional privilege."
It appears that constitutional grounds exist for overturning the
void conviction doctrine." It should also be remembered that the
New Mexico Supreme Court has stated that it has the "inherent
power to see that a man's fundamental rights are protected in every
case." 9 This power should be exercised to overturn the void conviction doctrine in New Mexico. The modern goals of criminal
confinement are the reformation and the rehabilitation of the convicted criminal.40 Enforcement of the void conviction doctrine does
34. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
35. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
36. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964).

37. See notes 6 & 7 suPra and accompanying text.
38. For an argument that the void conviction doctrine is unconstitutional because the
defendant might receive a harsher sentence when he is resentenced than that imposed
pursuant to the void conviction, see Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: HarsherPenalties
And The "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74- Yale L. J. 606 (1965).
39. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
40. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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not contribute to the realization of either goal. A rule of law that
does not permit a period of imprisonment served under a void conviction to be credited to a sentence imposed on the defendant in a
subsequent retrial and conviction on the same charge4 is unnecessary
and unjustifiably harsh.
RANNE B. MILLER

41. See note 21 supra and accompanying text on the result in Morgan.

